












































































































































































































































































asked	 to	 fill	 out	 a	 20-pages	 drop-off	 questionnaire	 and	 to	 return	 it	 via	 mail	 (which	 74%	 of	 the	 initial	
respondents	did,	 leading	 to	a	 sample	 size	of	1403).	 The	exact	wordings	of	 the	questions	 in	 the	BNES	are	as	
follows:	
Question	1:	“People	who	do	not	have	sufficient	means	of	subsistence	in	Belgium	can	obtain	social	
assistance	from	the	OCMW.	Do	you	think	that	amount	is	too	high	or	too	low?”	Answer	categories:	1	
(Much	too	high)	–	5	(Much	too	low)	
Question	2:	“People	who	do	not	have	sufficient	means	of	subsistence	in	Belgium	can	obtain	social	
assistance	from	the	OCMW.	There	are	few	people	who	know	exactly	how	much	the	social	assistance	
benefit	is.	Expressed	in	euros,	how	high	do	you	estimate	the	social	assistance	benefit	is	for	someone	
who	lives	alone?	You	can	always	guess	when	you	do	not	know	the	correct	amount.”	
Question	3:	“People	who	do	not	have	sufficient	means	of	subsistence	in	Belgium	can	obtain	social	
assistance	from	the	OCMW.	In	the	case	of	a	single	person,	the	social	assistance	benefit	is	currently	817	
Euro	per	month.	Do	you	think	that	amount	is	too	high	or	too	low?”	Answer	categories:	1	(Much	too	
high)	–	5	(Much	too	low)	
In	order	to	avoid	memory	effects,	questions	1	and	2	were	included	in	the	first	survey,	and	question	3	in	the	
second	survey.	
5	The	UK	questions	are	given	in	Baumberg	Geiger	(submitted),	Table	3	(for	approach	1)	and	Table	1	(for	
approach	2).		
6	The	main	differences	are:	(i)	the	Belgian	questions	refer	to	a	benefit	including	housing	costs	(as	there	is	no	
separate	housing	benefit),	whereas	the	UK	questions	explicitly	exclude	housing	costs;	(ii)	for	approach	1,	the	
Belgian	questions	are	asked	in	two	separate	surveys	(the	follow-up	question	being	asked	in	a	self-completion	
survey	after	the	interview),	whereas	the	British	questions	are	asked	directly	following	one	another;	and	(iii)	the	
claimant	types	are	different	between	countries	for	approach	2.	
benefits	beliefs	are	clearly	not	a	precondition	of	the	more	positive	benefits	attitudes	in	Belgium	(see	
Figure	2).		
Moreover,	even	at	the	moments	in	history	where	the	benefits	system	was	being	expanded,	hostile	
attitudes	to	some	groups	of	claimants	existed.	For	example,	in	the	midst	of	the	US	New	Deal,	there	
was	“far	more	skepticism	and	outright	hostility	towards	the	safety	net	than	our	admiring	view	of	the	
policy	history	would	suggest”	(Newman	&	Jacobs,	2008).	Hudson	&	Lunt	(this	volume)	likewise	find	
such	attitudes	in	the	postwar	consensus	of	1960s	Britain;	for	example,	they	show	that	large	
majorities	agreed	that	‘many	people	are	drawing	supplementary	benefit/national	assistance	who	
could	really	be	earning	enough	to	support	themselves	if	they	wanted	to’.	The	same	is	true	in	the	
relatively	generous	systems	of	present-day	Scandinavia.	For	example,	68-73%	of	people	in	
Scandinavian	countries	say	that	people	often	look	down	on	social	assistance	claimants	(Albrekt	
Larsen,	2006:Table	6.2),	while	29-43%	of	Scandinavians	agree	that	social	benefits/services	make	
people	lazy,	and	32-51%	agree	that	many	people	manage	to	obtain	benefits/services	that	they	are	
not	entitled	to.7		
In	fact,	if	we	look	across	European	countries,	the	perception	of	negative	economic	and	moral	
consequences	is	higher	in	those	countries	that	have	higher	social	expenditures	(van	Oorschot	et	al.,	
2012:192).	The	perception	of	negative	consequences	across	each	country	in	the	ESS	is	shown	below	
in	Figure	2,	and	highlights	that	the	Scandinavian	countries	are	unexceptional	in	their	perception	of	
negative	consequences;	it	is	clearly	not	the	case	such	attitudes	present	an	insurmountable	barrier	to	
more	generous	welfare	states.		What	van	Oorschot	et	al	make	clear,	however,	is	that	the	perception	
of	positive	consequences	of	the	welfare	state	–	preventing	widespread	poverty,	creating	a	more	
equal	society,	and	helping	people	combine	work	and	family	–	is	higher	still	in	these	countries.	As	
they	put	it,	“a	higher	spending	welfare	state	promotes	its	social	legitimacy	by	stimulating	in	people	
the	idea	that	it	is	doing	a	good	job,	more	than	that	it	arouses	their	worries	about	its	effect	on	the	
economy	and	morals.”		
[Figure	2	about	here]	
Again,	it	is	important	to	be	clear	on	my	argument	here.	I	am	not	claiming	that	negative	attitudes	
towards	benefits	are	equally	high	in	Scandinavian	countries	as	the	UK,	as	Figure	2	makes	clear	
(indeed,	the	same	ESS	data	shows	that	far	more	Britons	think	that	social	benefits/services	make	
people	lazy).	Nor	am	I	claiming	that	Scandinavian	perceptions	of	their	benefits	system	are	as	
erroneous	as	British	perceptions	(Britons	perceive	higher	levels	of	unemployment	and	long-term	
sickness	compared	to	Swedes,	for	example,	despite	Sweden	having	higher	levels	of	both;	Baumberg	
Geiger,	In	Press).	Instead,	I	want	to	argue	that	myths	and	perceptions	of	undeservingness	are	not	
unique	to	the	UK,	and	can	be	found	even	in	times	and	places	in	which	the	benefits	system	is	much	
more	generous.	What	is	different	in	such	settings	is	not	whether	such	ideas	exist	to	any	great	extent	
in	society,	but	how	widespread	they	are,	and	how	far	they	are	balanced	by	widespread	perceptions	
of	more	positive	consequences	of	the	welfare	state.		
																																								 																				
7	Authors	own	analysis	of	weighted	ESS	data	2008.	
The	ambivalence	of	benefits	attitudes		
What	characterises	attitudes	to	the	benefits	system,	above	all,	is	ambivalence.	This	seems	to	be	true	
of	all	countries	at	all	times	–	even	when	the	benefits	system	is	generous	and	popular,	many	people	
still	have	some	concerns,	as	the	previous	section	has	shown.	The	same	is	true	in	reverse	for	21st	
century	Britain:	even	though	attitudes	are	usually	felt	to	be	predominantly	hostile,	many	people	
have	positive	elements	to	their	attitudes	to	the	benefits	system.	For	example,	when	last	asked	(in	
2003),	over	half	of	people	said	that	they	were	proud	of	Britain’s	social	security	system	(and	not	just	
proud	about	the	welfare	state	in	general).	Nearly	80%	of	respondents	agree	that	large	numbers	who	
are	eligible	for	benefits	fail	to	claim	them	(both	from	BSA	data	in	Baumberg	et	al.,	2012:17).	And	
there	is	relatively	widespread	agreement	in	the	ESS	data	in	the	previous	section	that	the	benefits	
system	has	positive	consequences	in	preventing	widespread	poverty	(57%)	and	helping	people	
combine	work	and	family	(58%).	
Another	way	of	expressing	this	ambivalence	is	to	look	within	a	single	country	at	how	far	groups	
perceived	to	be	deserving	are	supported	compared	to	groups	perceived	to	be	undeserving.	In	the	UK	
in	2013,	far	more	people	thought	there	should	be	less	spending	on	unemployment	benefits	than	
though	that	spending	should	rise	(49%	less	vs.	15%	more).	Yet	the	same	respondents	also	
overwhelmingly	thought	there	should	be	more	spending	on	disabled	people	who	cannot	work	(4%	
less,	54%	more)	(Baumberg,	2014:9).	This	has	visible	impacts	on	political	debate,	most	recently	with	
the	(right-wing)	Government’s	attempt	to	cut	a	(non-work-related)	disability	benefit	by	tightening	
the	eligibility	criteria.	This	faced	overwhelming	public	disagreement	(two	polls	at	the	time	put	
opposition	to	the	policy	at	70%	and	84%)8	and	seems	to	have	been	scrapped	in	the	light	of	a	
backbench	rebellion	and	the	(partially-attributable)	resignation	of	the	Secretary	of	State	(against	
what	he	argued	to	be	a	policy	imposed	by	the	Treasury).9	
Such	differentiation	according	to	deservingness	judgements	is	by	no	means	limited	to	the	UK;	
indeed,	Wim	van	Oorschot	has	influentially	argued	that	there	is	a	universal	ranking	of	different	
claimant	groups	from	most	deserving	to	least	deserving	(van	Oorschot,	2006).	Aarøe	&	Petersen	
(2014)	have	likewise	argued	that	both	Americans	and	Danes	show	a	similar	‘deservingness	heuristic’,	
with	citizens	of	both	countries	making	similar	judgements	about	whether	hypothetical	claimants	are	
worthy	of	support	when	given	a	clear	sign	about	their	motivation	to	work.	It	is	only	when	people	are	
asked	to	form	an	opinion	about	benefits	claimants	in	the	absence	of	clear	deservingness	clues	that	
the	expected	US-Denmark	differences	are	visible.	
The	challenge	in	the	UK	is	therefore	not	that	negative	attitudes	exist,	nor	that	there	is	little	support	
for	claimants	who	are	seen	to	be	undeserving,	nor	even	that	there	is	ambivalence	about	the	benefits	
system	–	for	all	of	these	are	universal.	Rather,	the	challenge	is	that	public	debate	about	benefits	
emphasises	the	negative	side	of	this	ambivalence	at	the	expense	of	the	positive	side,	and	
emphasises	undeserving	claimants	over	deserving	ones.	Hence	in	Figure	2,	the	balance	of	positive	vs.	
negative	perceived	consequences	of	the	welfare	state	is	higher	in	the	Scandinavian	countries	than	
																																								 																				
8	See	the	YouGov	poll	16-17	March	at	https://yougov.co.uk/news/2016/03/18/least-fair-budget-
omnishambles/	and	the	Ipsos	MORI	poll	19-22/3/2016	at	https://www.ipsos-
mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/3713/George-Osbornes-satisfaction-ratings-equal-his-worst-
ever-following-budget.aspx#gallery[m]/2/		
9	See	http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-35848687		
nearly	every	other	European	country,	while	the	UK	in	contrast	has	the	most	negative	perceived	
balance	of	any	country	barring	Slovakia	and	Hungary	(van	Oorschot	et	al.,	2012:188).	This	is	reflected	
in	media	coverage:	stories	about	benefits	in	Britain	are	split	between	the	positive	and	negative,	
while	stories	in	the	Scandinavian	press	are	usually	positive	(Larsen	&	Dejgaard,	2013).	
Conclusion		
In	this	article,	I	have	argued	that	some	of	the	concerns	of	British	progressives	about	how	to	respond	
to	myths	and	harsh	benefit	attitudes	are	misplaced.	It	is	true	that	many	benefit	myths	are	
widespread	in	Britain,	and	that	claimants	are	perceived	more	harshly	than	twenty	or	thirty	years	ago	
–	and	there	are	also	some	signs	that	these	myths	and	harsh	attitudes	are	linked.	However,	it	is	
doubtful	that	‘mythbusting’	will	have	large	impacts	on	either	of	them.	Moreover,	it	is	not	clear	that	
progressive	benefits	system	reforms	depend	on	wiping	out	either	myths	or	perceived	
undeservingness,	as	these	can	be	found	in	more	generous	benefit	systems	ranging	from	post-war	
Britain	to	present-day	Scandinavia.	At	the	population	level,	people	are	fundamentally	ambivalent	
about	benefits	systems,	and	what	is	critical	is	the	balance	between	the	positive	and	negative	aspects	
of	this	ambivalence.	This	is	a	different	starting	point	than	most	current	debates	on	benefits	in	
Britain,	but	one	that	is	borne	out	by	the	evidence,	and	takes	the	debates	in	a	different	direction.	
This	obviously	leaves	the	question	of	how	to	influence	this	balance	–	but	to	avoid	repeating	an	
argument	I	have	previously	made	in	this	journal,	I	will	only	summarise	this	briefly	here	(for	a	fuller	
argument,	see	Baumberg,	2012).	The	cornerstones	of	debates	about	benefits	are	often	set	by	the	
benefits	system	itself:	some	systems	‘open	up’	questions	of	deservingness,	while	others	close	them	
down	(Albrekt	Larsen,	2006).	This	still	leaves	some	space	to	‘reframe’	debates	to	support	progressive	
reforms	(Lakoff,	2014),	but	these	need	to	resonate	with	people’s	existing	beliefs,	which	are	in	turn	
partly	structured	by	the	present	system.	While	it	is	therefore	impossible	to	take	progressive	leaps	at	
first,	it	may	be	easier	to	take	a	series	of	small	steps	that	successively	unlock	the	possibility	of	
hitherto	impossible	changes.	This	is	something	that	Conservative	politicians	have	appreciated	(albeit	
with	opposing	aims),	setting	in	motion	reforms	in	the	1980s	that	change	public	preferences	and	
political	possibilities	in	the	2010s.	As	Margaret	Thatcher	once	said,	“it	isn't	that	I	set	out	on	economic	
policies…	Economics	are	the	method;	the	object	is	to	change	the	heart	and	soul”	(Thatcher,	1981).		
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